IN my second book “BUMPS Fifty Years of Dictatorship and Democracy in the Philippines (1972-2022), I discussed the conflicting themes of democracy and authoritarianism in Philippine political history. The biggest attacks on Philippine democracy happened during the tumultuous six-year presidency of Rodrigo Duterte. Excerpts of Chapter 12:
“THE most pronounced post-Marcos attacks on Philippine democracy occurred when Rodrigo Duterte became president on June 30, 2016. After he was sworn into office, he immediately took the bull by its horns by ordering the immediate killing sprees of suspected drug addicts and traders. Hundreds, if not, thousands, were summarily killed in the succeeding days and weeks by either teams of police officers under the Philippine National Police (PNP) or unnamed vigilante groups, whose members wore hoods to hide their faces, while gunning down hapless targets. In the exercise of his brand of populism, Duterte, no matter how crude and primitive, did not lose sight to present his brand of a palpable counterrevolution to the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution that has restored democracy in the era that followed the Marcos dictatorship.
Duterte and his cohorts floated as alternatives two successive political formulae should public criticisms mount against the spate of state-sponsored extrajudicial killings (EJKs). The formulae were both about a possible return to authoritarianism, or dictatorship. The first formula, Plan A, was the adoption of a revolutionary government to replace the constitutional government created by the 1987 Constitution. The second formula, Plan B, was, if the calls for the proposed revolutionary government failed, the proposed adoption of a federal form of government to replace the current unitary government. There was also a Plan C, which was the adoption of a new constitution to replace the current one. Like the first two formulae, it did not gather steam and failed.
NOTHING DEMOCRATIC. There was nothing democratic in the spate of EJKs, which Duterte ordered to eradicate the drug menace. Duterte used the democratic space to pursue his diabolical agenda of murdering the very people he swore to serve. His state sponsored war on drugs was heavily criticized by the local and international human rights organizations, the Church, and civil society. Despite the relentless criticisms, Duterte pursued his war on drugs with failing results despite deaths of thousands.
Two conflicting themes dominate Philippine postwar political experience: democracy and authoritarianism. The dichotomy of the two political themes is evident over the past seven decades or so. Moreover, scholars called the summary executions of hapless citizens as a form of “democratic backsliding.”
Pro-democracy forces want the democratic institutions and structures to survive and thrive to become stronger, responsive, and more pronounced. They want the democratic processes to flourish. They believe in pluralism, a belief system that allows and tolerates various world views and advocacy regardless of the differences, arguing that they have spaces for intense debates, coexistence, and growth. The authoritarian forces tilt towards a monolithic belief system, which is the complete opposite of the democratic forces’ view of pluralism.
Thirty nine years ago, the Filipino people demonstrated to the entire world one of their finest qualities as a people. Rising like the proverbial phoenix from the morass of mass poverty and misery in the historic and momentous 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, the Filipino people, in their exercise of their sovereign right, toppled the Marcos dictatorship. The EDSA Revolution has become the global template to oust despots and usher a peaceful transition to democracy. It was a defining moment for the Filipino people, who hold the collective bragging rights that even the most powerful and most entrenched dictator could be toppled if only the people would unite. Several nations, which had the same authoritarian experience, copied our bloodless revolution to become our peaceful revolution a global model.
SUDDEN OUTBURST. On Oct. 13, 2017, the unpredictable Duterte, in a sudden outburst again, threatened the political opposition that he would declare a revolutionary government if they opposed his war on drugs that already killed hundreds, if not thousands, of hapless, helpless, and powerless citizens. Speaking before the radio program “Sa Totoo Lang” hosted by Erwin Tulfo, Duterte said he had enough problems with criminality, drugs, rebellion, among other things and that if pushed to the extreme, “I will declare the suspension of [the privilege of] the writ of habeas corpus and I will arrest all of you.”
It was all sound bites. The temperamental Duterte did not present details of his suggested revolutionary government. Duterte had not established a reputation for being a visionary and thinker, who would present new ideas in a coherent, profound, and organized manner. But his threat drew concerns from prodemocracy groups and human rights advocates here and abroad. A revolutionary government means the collapse or the dismantling of the current government to be replaced by a revolutionary government that would scrap the 1987 Constitution and the existing laws. It is a dictatorship, by all means.
“If he declares a revolutionary government, does this mean that he is abandoning his oath?” then Vice President Leni Robredo said after hearing Duterte’s threat. Declaring a revolutionary government is against the Constitution and, as the elected president, he promised to protect the 1987 Constitution, she said. Duterte cited the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino as example, but he was widely criticized for his lack of understanding of the political context of Cory Aquino’s revolutionary government.
As history shows, revolutionary governments had fathers. The revolutionary government of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo in 1898 had the 1896 Revolution as its father, although his revolutionary government was stillborn. Cory Aquino’s revolutionary government had the widely acclaimed 1986 EDSA Revolution as its father but it succeeded unlike Aguinaldo’s. Duterte’s notion of a revolutionary was fatherless. It was an orphan at the outset. It did not take off.
What Duterte proposed was the disdainful counterrevolution to the EDSA Revolution. This counterrevolution sought to destroy and dismantle the restored democracy and supplant it with an authoritarian regime to entrench a cabal of gangsters and a host pf power greedy political dynasties. Initially launched as an antidrug campaign in 2016, of which 16 million of naïve, hapless, and clueless voters were hoodwinked, the counterrevolution expanded to include assaults on democratic institutions – the Supreme Court, Commission on Elections, Commission on Human Rights, and Office of the Ombudsman. This counterrevolution sought to weaken democratic traditions like adherence to human rights, and the twin principles of rule of law, and due process. The recipe for national suicide was prepared by men and women – mostly political dynasties – leading the counterrevolution.
They wanted to prove that the previous revolutions did not improve the Philippines and only the reinstitution of a populist, albeit authoritarian, regime could save the country. The goal was to reinstall a new dictatorship, enabling Duterte or his designated successor to rule beyond his term in 2022. They wanted to revise history in their favor. The coalition of authoritarian forces composed of the Dutertes, the Marcoses, the Arroyos, the Estradas, and a number of fat political dynasties pursued their counterrevolution through a revolutionary government, or RevGov; or if it failed an amendment in the Constitution to replace the unitary form of government by a federal system.
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‘DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING.’
In his classic book “The Philippines: From ‘People Power’ to Democratic Backsliding,” the American scholar Mark Thompson discussed how the too powerful Filipino president like Rodrigo Duterte led what he considered a “democratic sliding” by destroying the gains of the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution and plunging the country into the verge of another experiment of authoritarian rule. He described Duterte’s ascendancy into power as a form of what he termed as “illiberal populism,” which throws away liberal tenets like adherence to constitution, belief in elections, the rule of law, and due process.
Citing “hyper-presidentialism,” where a Filipino president enjoys enormous powers, Thompson said Duterte used his wide discretion over budgetary matters to provide favors to political leaders in an essentially patronage-driven democracy, making him a “patron-in-chief.” Hence, he controlled Congress, the courts, and the independent bodies, despite being theoretically coequal branches of government or constitutionally mandated agencies. It established his authority on nearly the entire bureaucracy.[2]
Then, Duterte unleashed his bloody but failed war on drugs and coopted the Philippine National Police (PNP) as the main implementing institution in his erratic campaign. Thompson’s book used the structural approach to view and analyze what could be regarded as the nation’s shift towards strongman rule within the historical backdrop of nearly a century of Philippine presidential politics. The country stands as one of the global cases of “hyper-presidentialism,” according to him. He asserted that Filipino presidents possessed more formal power than their U.S. counterparts, particularly their wide discretion over budgetary issues. Duterte, he said, pioneered the use of political violence, killing the powerless and hapless “dregs of society” like those drug addicts and smalltime traders.
In his analysis, Thompson stresses the presence of four influential non-governmental strategic groups – the Roman Catholic Church, big business, civil society, and the military. They have played pivotal roles in constraining presidential power since independence in 1946, particularly during the later stages of the Marcos dictatorship and in the post-Marcos era. While not directly part of the government, these groups maintained close ties to the state, with representatives from big business and civil society often holding high-ranking positions in presidential cabinets. They possessed extensive organizations that enabled them to mobilize supporters in favor of or against a president, either through nonviolent means such as demonstrations or, in the case of the military, through a show of force via military intervention.
‘PATRONAGE POLITICS.’ The book integrates three key themes from existing literature – patronage democracy, political violence, and mass poverty – to view the nation’s recurring democratic crises. According to Thompson, the democratic transition that commenced after Marcos’ downfall in 1986 was only temporary. The “people power” uprising in Metro Manila in February 1986 captured global media attention and praise. The peaceful overthrow of an authoritarian ruler by civilian protesters, who demanded restoration, showed the capacity for change. Thompson argued the people’s perception underwent a remarkable metamorphosis in the Philippines especially since the time of Cory Aquino.
Thompson recalled that two additional crises unfolded in the subsequent three decades. Another “people power” uprising, dubbed as “EDSA Dos,” took place, but this time it was directed against the elected Joseph Estrada in 2001. His successor, GMA, faced legitimacy issues throughout her erratic, scandal-ridden tenure. In 2016, Duterte was elected after he pledged a brutal war on drugs. But Duterte took an illiberal path in this presidency.
Going deeper into his diagnosis of the illiberal path, Thompson said this democratic backsliding occurred against the backdrop of historically rooted structural conditions in which neoliberal economic strategies revived economic growth but failed significantly to ease mass poverty, enabling Duterte to secure power. He noted the fact that, while post-dictatorship presidents had recorded financial stability and stimulated economic growth in their incumbency, they were unsuccessful in eradicating mass poverty. This enabled Duterte to win the presidency.
Duterte, as president, launched a war on drugs that resulted in thousands of EJKs by the police and vigilantes linked to law enforcement. He justified the murders by dismissing liberalism and human rights as “Western” concepts. By late 2018, Chito Gascon, chair of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), estimated up to 27,000 suspected drug users and dealers were killed in the drug war. Duterte targeted mayors and local officials accused of having drug links; he had a narcolist, where their names were there. By June 2021, more than half of the 44 mayors, vice mayors, and other local officials identified by the Philippine president as being “narco politicians” were killed.
According to Thompson, despite his illiberalism, Duterte claimed democratic legitimacy by aligning with larger global trends. Unlike Donald Trump and right-wing populists in developed countries, who targeted immigrants, Duterte identified drug users and dealers as “enemies of the people.” His violent populism was beyond the typical “penal populism” seen in the West, representing illiberal rule that embraced an aggressive “us versus them” mentality. Thompson reminded that through his “war on drugs,” Duterte got massive popular support, surpassing the levels achieved by other illiberal populists globally.
POLITICAL VIOLENCE. According to him, Duterte was not the first Philippine president to employ political violence to consolidate power. Elpidio Quirino relied on local warlords to intimidate the political opposition during the presidential elections in 1949. Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. was convicted of murdering his father’s chief political rival, Julio Nalundasan. In his reelection campaign in 1969, Marcos employed both the paramilitary and military, which he controlled before he declared martial law in 1972.
Duterte eroded democracy through less violent means as well, weakened judicial independence, marginalized independent institutions, and bullied local leaders. His emergence was facilitated by the perceived weakening of key elite strategic groups like the Catholic Church, among others. In the end, Thompson argued the democratic backsliding was a result of Duterte’s violation of democratic norms in a patronage-driven democracy with weak institutionalization. He argued Duterte did not harbor hostility towards the oligarchy. He used such rhetoric to attack his political enemies and favor his own allies.
His predecessors’ broken promises to combat corruption and ease mass poverty led to simplistic solutions to the complex social problems, shown by Duterte’s “dystopian narrative” of the drug war. It was then popular across class lines as indicated by Duterte’s redirection of the poor’s grievances away from the social reforms. Duterte used mass poverty to justify the erosion of democratic values. Employing pseudo-social reforms, Duterte portrayed his war on drugs as a “panacea” (cure-all pill) for the national issues, triggering popular support across different social strata despite the fact that “it harmed and disproportionately targeted the poor.”
To legitimize his strategy, Duterte used largely hollow promises of social reforms to reduce corruption and eliminate illegal drugs. He employed “brute force governance,” as shown by personalized strongman rule, blame-shifting, and undermined accountability mechanisms. For a while, it enabled him to keep public approval despite the drug war’s failure to address substance abuse and the ineffectiveness of widespread lockdown in curbing the spread of the pandemic. Despite the highly illiberal nature of Duterte’s rule, he continued to claim democratic legitimacy based on competitive elections and high approval ratings, while adhering to constitutional norms.
Thompson concluded his analysis by citing how the “people power” narrative lost credibility, as shown by the political opposition’s defeat in the 2022 elections. This outcome demonstrated the diminishing appeal of this discourse among the majority of Filipinos. The recent democratic backsliding in the Philippines serves as a cautionary tale about the failure of a liberal reformist agenda to improve the lives of ordinary people and fundamentally reshape the political system to reduce reliance on patronage, strengthen institutions, and mitigate political violence. Given Thompson’s assessment of Duterte’s election and his populist legacy as the latest iteration of a cyclical pattern in Philippine politics, this book represents a valuable contribution to the literature on populism.
WASHOUT ACTRESS. Duterte’s supporters picked up his call to declare a revolutionary government and launched a series of mass actions, which all failed because it did not gain a mass of adherents to support it. Their mass actions were sheer madness by all means. Two dozens of supporters held a picket in front of all places – the Office of the Vice President, on a day that was declared a holiday. It was led by a washout actress – Vivian Velez, who used to have a stunning body in her youth, but has looked matronly after she gained weight in later years. [3]
Mass actions that made the similar call were held in Davao City and Cebu City but they hardly triggered huge crowds. A few dozens attended those rallies. The main rally came on Nov. 30, 2017 at the foot of Mendiola Bridge or the intersection of Legarda Avenue, C.M. Recto Avenue, and Mendiola Street, but no visible crowd attended the purported rally. In brief, it was a dismal failure as the number of street hawkers was far greater than the supposed rallyists. It was a pathetic scene. It was the pathetic end of the call for revolutionary government – at least temporarily because it was resurrected two years later only to fail again.
Duterte’s call for a revolutionary government did not gain ground as major sectors, including the Majority Church, or the dominant Roman Catholic Church, and the Minority Church composed of various Christian denominations and evangelical groups (with the glaring exception of two sects – Iglesia Ni Cristo and Kingdom of Jesus Christ), the defense and military establishment, and the business sector sent cold signals in virtual rejection of his overtures to assault the democratic institutions. For instance, the Nov. 30, 2017 nationwide show of force by the authoritarian groups for RevGov was a pathetic failure. Despite the state resources in their hands, they could not sustain the counterrevolution. The rallies supporting RevGov in major cities attracted a mere handful of participants. They hardly created any dent or impression on the national consciousness.
This only goes to show that ours was no Weimar Republic, the weak German republic that replaced the monarchy shortly after the end of the First World War. It took nearly two decades of existence for the Weimar Republic to collapse when Adolf Hitler took over Germany and instituted a dictatorship to ignite the Second World War. The post-Marcos democratic government still holds until now. The gangsters in government were lost and, ergo, could not sustain the counterrevolution. It did not mean the democratic forces should rest on their laurels.
(To be continued)
