ALTHOUGH the July 25 Supreme Court decision has laid down what could be considered as jurisprudence on the constitutionality of the Articles of Impeachment against Sara Duterte, it is by all means a poorly written verdict that that has not clarified the issues on her impeachment trial and the accompanying jurisprudence.
Although the decision, a ponencia of Senior Associate Justice Mario Victor Leonen, has defined impeachment as essentially a “political process,” and is therefore “sui generies” (one of its kind), it remains within the ambit of the Constitution. Ergo, it is subject to judicial review, it said. Still, the verdict has nevertheless come out as a form of judicial legislation that tends to violate the constitutional precept on separation of powers of the three branches of government – Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary.
In what is now being described as a case of judicial overreach, the Supreme Court, primarily composed of unelected and unelectable magistrates, has sought to impose new ways on how the House of Representatives, theoretically a co-equal branch of government, could and should handle future impeachment complaints. There are views that the High Court, in its decision, has sought to protect Sara but not the country.
Legal luminaries and scholars claimed the decision was based mainly on factual errors. Because of the glaring factual errors as premises, the jurisprudence the decision has sought to establish could not be taken seriously as judicial doctrines in the strictest sense of the word. Hence, they should not be taken as part of the laws of the land unless the High Court completes the task of facing the motion of reconsideration (MRs) the House and two other parties have filed earlier.
No less than Reynato Puno and Artemio Panganiban, two former chief justices, assailed the verdict. Puno was categorical in describing it not only as an instance of judicial overreach, but a bad case of judicial activism. In assailing the verdict, Puno has brought with him the Philippine Constitutional Association (Philconsa), a group of lawyers, who are experts in constitutional law. Puno is its chair.
Retired magistrate Adolf Azcuna also criticized the decision. Azcuna, a member of the 49-man commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution and author of the constitutional provisions on impeachment and public accountability of state officials, noticed it has ignored previous doctrines. Retired magistrates Conchita Carpio Morales and Antonio Carpio also criticized the verdict for being premised on wrong judicial doctrine, as it ignored the 2012 decision on Francisco v. House of Representatives case.
The issues on the Duterte v House of Representatives decision were simple. But they were made difficult and complicated by Leonen’s convoluted ponencia that tended to hide the simplicity of the issues at Bar. His style was described as pedantic to show his alleged mastery of the law. While his searing logic highlights his alleged knowledge of judicial doctrines, his ponencia collapses like a castle made of sand because it was based on wrong facts.
The House has no choice but to file an MR, questioning the High Court’s application of the one-year ban rule under the Constitution. It argued that the High Court erred when it failed to apply the judicial doctrine that was laid down in the Francisco v. House of Representatives case in 2012.
According to the House MR, the Francisco doctrine said impeachment is initiated either upon referral of a filed complaint to the House committee or through a direct filing by at least one third of the House membership. In its decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the House violated the one-year ban, when it submitted the Articles of Impeachment after “it failed to act” on the first three impeachment cases submitted by three different parties to the House.
According to the House MR, the first three impeachment complaints were not “unacted upon,” terminated, or dismissed when the House archieved them before the congressional break. It also argued that the first three complaints showed that impeachment is inherently a procedural process that requires the Senate to hold immediately a trial on the impeached public official.
According to the MR, the Constitution does not require a hearing after the filing of a complaint backed by at least one-third of the House membership. What the Constitution is the transmittal and immediate start of a trial in the Senate. It cites Section (4) of Article 11 of the Constitution: “In case the verified complaint of resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.”
The decision went further on its interpretation of the issues of every impeachment complaint. While policymaking is the domain of the Legislature, or Congress, under the Constitution, the Supreme Court, in trying its lay down the jurisprudence on impeachment cases, has taken steps to lay down ways on how the House should handle future impeachment cases.
Instead of leaving the job to the House on how best it could discern and handle the future impeachment complaints, the Supreme Court prescribed in its decision on what the House should do in an act of judicial legislation. It could be said too that the High Court has attempted to amend the House’s internal rules on impeachment complaints.
The High Court’s decision on the impeachment trial of Misfit Sara could be regarded as much ado over nothing. It spoke of complex judicial doctrines on the basis of factual errors. There were plenty of legal mambo jambos on the issue. But the actual intention is the High Court committed judicial overreach that later became judicial legislation.
The decision spoke lengthily on issues which were the results of the erratic determination of facts. Since it was based mainly on factual errors, it drew erroneous conclusions. Legal luminaries completely ignored the legal arguments raised by Leonen ponencia.
