MANY thing happened when a contingent of PNP personnel and Interpol operatives captured and arrested ex-President Rodrigo Duterte on March 11, 2025 and flew him in to the ICC headquarters in The Hague the following day. His family and loyal supporters claimed Duterte was kidnapped and flown to The Hague against his will.
My book, which is a documentation of Duterte’s bloody but ill-fated war on drugs, discussed this matter in Chapter 20 of the revised and updated edition of my book, “KILL KILL KILL Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines; Crimes Against Humanity v. Edrigo Duterte Et. Al.’ The original and first edition in late 2023 has 11 chapters, while the second edition in late 2025 has 18 chapters. The third edition has 21 chapters. Excerpts:
OTHER LOCAL INITIATIVES
WHILE members of progressive groups gathered at Fuente Osmeña Circle in Cebu City and families of extrajudicial killings (EJKs) victims marked March 11 as “the day of reckoning” and justice and politicians critical of Duterte called it victory for accountability, the supporters of the former president, who faces crimes against humanity at the ICC, pursued attempts to present a reverse narrative. They framed his arrest as a sort of “persecution” and “betrayal of sovereignty.” They pointed to President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. as the most responsible for his arrest and trip to The Hague.
Although the President previously said he could not see any ICC jurisdiction over Duterte and virtually shut the door on any deal with any party, Duterte’s supporters called him a “traitor.” Duterte supporters chanted “Marcos resign” after Davao City Mayor and son Sebastian Duterte delivered a speech on March 16 at 99th Araw ng Dabaw celebration. He said: “Marcos will never be loved” by Duterte supporters. They also burned Marcos effigies. His supporters also claimed a conspiracy between the communists and Liberal Party stalwarts, which only triggered laughter for the people, who are in the know.
It was a battle between two narratives: the victimhood narrative, as espoused by the Davao City group and Duterte supporters, against the justice narrative as championed by his critics. His supporters claimed his antidrug war, although fraught with violent nationwide orgies of EJKs, was intended to make the country “safe.” But his critics believe otherwise. They celebrated his arrest and capture as a political victory for the twin principles of public accountability and rule of law. The battle between the two themes continued in the runup of the 2025 midterm elections. By all means, the 2025 midterm elections served as a sort of referendum on the Duterte arrest. But this is another story.
After his arrest and trip to The Hague, an escalation of political counter-mobilization was perceived. For instance, the PDP-Laban party and even the Duterte family took the protest to the Supreme Court gates in Padre Faura St. in the Manila District of Ermita by placing placards with the messages “SC: JUSTICE DELAY, JUSTICE DENIED” and “JUSTICE BAYAD” to press the High Court to act on petitions challenging the ICC warrant for Duterte. There was an online surge in hate content of the pro-Duterte netizens and groups. The anti-EJK group, Rise Up for Life and for Rights, reported a sharp increase in threats, harassment, and hate speech against the families of EJK victims following his arrest, attributing the heightened volume to the hate network of his supporters.
In short, supporters met the arrest with prayer rallies, effigy burning, and a massive paid online victimization campaign, and met opponents’ celebration by labeling it partisan revenge, sovereignty betrayal, and “dilawan and communist” conspiracy of sorts. They channeled their energy towards the President and his perceived allies. The most perceptible outcome was that they hardly caused any ripple that would lead to Duterte’s release, temporary or not. They failed. And they failed dismally because even the judicial processes at the ICC did not give him even a provisional liberty.
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IMEE MARCOS FAILED INITIATIVE
INSTEAD of focusing on the impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte, which would require the 24 senators to set the impeachment rules and other related matters, the Senate, largely through the initiative of Sen. Imee Marcos launched what could be regarded an ill conceived probe “in aid of legislation” into Duterte’s arrest by the ICC and subsequent detention. Imee Marcos, another ill-reputed ally of Sara Duterte and perceived as an open political enemy of the President, her younger brother, convened the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which she then chaired under the 19th Congress
Despite the political campaign for the May 12, 2026 midterm elections of which Imee Marcos was running for reelection, Imee presided over three committee public hearings on March 20, April 3, and April 10, 2025 and her committee took up specific issues. First, it looked into Duterte’s arrest at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and subsequent capture at the Villamor Air Base. It sought the reasons for his arrest, primarily the issuance of the ICC arrest warrant and his perceived subsequent surrender by the Marcos government to the ICC on the following day, March 12, 2025.
It asked whether the Philippines had the legal basis and obligation to arrest him after Duterte’s unilateral decision for the Philippines to withdraw in 2018 from the Rome Statute, the multilateral treaty that has created the ICC in 2001. It asked if the Interpol Red Notice was valid, or if it was only a diffusion notice. Moreover, the committee raised the issue of due process: Was there a Philippine court warrant? Was the warrantless arrest exception valid? Were constitutional safeguards for liberty of abode observed?
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED. The committee asked the rights of the arrested person under RA 7438, or the law that ensures the accused’s right to be visited by family, counsel, doctor, among others. It also asked if Sara Duterte, Imee’s ally, was blocked at Villamor Air Base in Pasay City where Rodrigo was captured. It asked about the preplanning aspects. Was the arrest spontaneous enforcement of the ICC and Interpol request, or prearranged whole-of-government operation? It dwelt on the Executive privilege, or can the Cabinet invoke privilege to withhold plans.
Among the invited witnesses were then Department of Justice (DoJ) secretary Jesus Crispin “Boying” Remulla, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) secretary Jonvic Remulla, then Philippine National Police (PNP) chief Gen Rommel Marbil, then PNP-CIDG chief Gen Nicolas Torre III, then Special Envoy for Transnational Crimes Markus Lacanilao, Philippine Center on Transnational Crimes (PCTC ) executive director Anthony Alcantara and representatives of the Interpol Manila, etc. Many invitees skipped the second and third hearings, invoking Executive privilege and national security.
Despite Imee’s gargantuan efforts in the middle of the political campaign for the 2025 midterm elections, the House Committee on Foreign Relations did not approve any official report containing its findings. In what appeared to be a ludicrous twist, it released its preliminary findings on March 27 and the final Chairman’s Report on April 29. Note that it was never called the Committee Report, as it was never approved. Hence, it was called the Chairman’s Report.
On May 2, 2025, Sen. Imee Marcos, in her capacity as chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, summarized her main findings:
• “The Philippines had no legal obligation to arrest former President Rodrigo Roa Duterte and turn him over to The Hague,” but it did not say it was illegal;
• “The Philippine government decided to assist the ICC to arrest [Duterte]”; and
• There was no locally issued arrest warrant in his arrest and it raised the question whether a local warrant was necessary to arrest a former head of state.
There were lengthy discussions on the Chairman’s Report, but for purposes of discussions, the following are noteworthy: “There were glaring violations of [Duterte’s] rights,” it said. According to Imee’s report, there was no legal obligation for the Philippine government to arrest Duterte. The ICC diffusion notice sent to Interpol was “red diffusion for wanted persons — provisional arrest only,” not “arrest and surrender.” There was no indication that the ICC requested surrender after provisional arrest, nor extradition, the Chairman’s report said.
REJECTION. Imee Marcos rejected as false the Marcos government narrative that it would be compelled if Interpol transmitted the Red Notice. There was no Red Notice, it was admitted in the public hearing. The PCTC said that what came out was a diffusion notice, which was equivalent to Red Notice, but Imee rejected that admission. She insisted that the Philippines was no longer a state party to the Rome Statute since its withdrawal took effect in 2019. Hence, there was no treaty obligation to surrender him, she insisted.
The government decided to assist, but said there was no preplanning. Then National Security Adviser Eduardo Año denied that there was no “core group” in a public hearing. They were only rumors, he said. For her part, Imee said: “The supposed ‘group effort’ was only based on rumors is incredible. This attempt to cover up what was already aired indicated a comprehensive plan that was already in place even before March 11.” Imee insisted on the alleged existence of “Operation Pursuit,” an 80-page police directive that detailed plans not only to arrest Rodrigo but to seize assets and monitor persons close to him, including partner Cielito “Honeylet” Avancena.
Imee said the Marcos administration “already started preparations prior to March 11.” She made some ridiculous exaggerations by claiming certain glaring violations and lapses on the human rights of Rodrigo Duterte, who was a notorious violator of human rights himself. There was no warrant issued by the Philippine court, she said. Imee claimed Rodrigo was taken out of the Philippines against his will. He was also deprived of his right to be visited by immediate family when police blocked Sara Duterte at Villamor, she said.
Imee Marcos claimed Duterte’s arrest and capture was part of her perceived whole-of-the- government effort to bring down the Dutertes. She said his arrest was politically motivated to undermine him and Sara before the 2028 elections. On May 2, 2025, Imee submitted the Chairman’s Report to then Ombudsman Samuel Martires, seeking the probe of Boying Remulla, Jonvic Remulla, Marbil, Torre, Lacanilao for alleged criminal and administrative offenses. There was nothing substantial that happened after her submission. Even Martirez, a known Duterte ally, ignored it.
NOT SENSE OF THE SENATE. The Chairman’s Report did not express the sense of the Senate about Rodrigo’s arrest and capture. It remained the Chairman’s Report, not the Committee Report that was approved by the majority of senators. It was the Imee Marcos report. Hence, it was not adopted as a Senate Resolution. The Senate did not vote and endorse it.
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. disagreed, as he publicly said: “Everyone is entitled to [his] opinion. I disagree.” He also rejected the claim that it was politically motivated to bring down the Dutertes. It was a baseless assertion, he said. Malacañang said the Executive privilege is rooted in the constitutional precept on “the separation of powers.”
Some matters cannot be publicized, the government complied with RA 9851 and Interpol obligation, it said. Sen. Imee Marcos herself complained: “Hinaharang ito sa Senado. Nahihirapan kami kumuha ng testigo (this was being stopped in the Senate. We’re having difficulties getting witnesses).”
Several officials did not show up at the committee public hearings, as they invoked Executive privilege. For his part, ICC defense lawyer Nicholas Kaufman, who represented Duterte in his first year of incarceration, claimed the Chairman’s Report was not published. But fact checkers said it was published online on the Senate website. But they said that contrary to claims, it was only the Chairman’s version, as it was not supported by a majority of senators.
Hence, it does not carry persuasive powers. Hence, the Chairman Report was not effective as a pro-Duterte narrative. It did not take off to become a tool to press for Rodrigo Duterte’s release from the ICC detention. It failed to express the Senate’s sense on the issue. No Senate resolution condemning Duterte’s arrest was ever passed. There was no Senate vote to censure the Executive.
Then Senate President Francis Escudero and later Sherwin Gatchalian did not schedule it for any plenary debate. In short: Imee’s probe and alleged findings never became the official Senate position. It was disowned by Malacañang, and officials under the Office of the Ombudsman still claimed they did what was good for the country.
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MIDTERM ELECTIONS OF 2025
THE March 11, 2025 capture, arrest, and subsequent trip and imprisonment of former President Rodrigo Duterte in the ICC detention facility and the Feb. 5, 2025 impeachment of Vice President Sara Duterte and her impending trial were among the issues that were raised in the runup of the May 12, 2025 midterm elections. It was bandied about as sort of a referendum on the Marcos-Duterte feud and a proxy war for Sara’s 2028 presidential bid.
There were issues of betrayal and disloyalty in the midterm elections. Toby Tiangco, a mediocre lawmaker who represents Navotas City in the House of Representatives, acted as the campaign manager of the pro-administration Alyansa para sa Bagong Pilipinas coalition. But he failed dismally in his efforts to put a number of proadministration candidates in the winning column. After the stinging losses, the anime looking Tiangco blamed the impeachment process for the political losses.
According to the weird looking Tiangco, the House’s move to send the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate on Feb. 5 hurt the chances of the Alyansa’s Senate slate in Mindanao, which was considered a Duterte country because of the inordinate numbers of voters, who speak the Cebuano dialect. But House leaders like outgoing Rep. Robert Ace Barbers of Surigao del Norte and Rep. Jude Acidre of the Tingog Party List, had a different narrative calling Tiango’s statement as “misleading and detached from real sentiment.”
HIGH WINNING AVERAGE. Barbers said: “In Mindanao, 36 out of 44 lawmakers, who signed the fourth impeachment complaint were reelected. That’s 81.81% win rate. If impeachment was a liability, we would’ve been wiped out. But we were overwhelmingly returned.” For his part, Acidre said: “Just to set the record straight, these results dismantle the narrative that impeachment was a political liability. What we’re seeing is the public that values courage over complicity.” Mindanao had 60 congressional districts of which 44 lawmakers were reelectionists. The winning average of 81% was a feat.
Of the 115 reelectionist lawmakers, who signed the fourth impeachment complaint, 100 were reelected for a 87% win rate nationwide. Only 15 signatories lost and they were not reelected for various reasons, which did not point to their support of the fourth impeachment complaint against Sara. Manila Rep. Joel Chua, who chaired the House Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability that probed the P612.5 million confidential fund, won over then Manila Councilor Apple Nieto, a candidate of Sara Duterte. To shame him, Sara herself went to the Manila District of Quiapo, Chua’s bailiwick, to raise Nieto’s hands and campaign against Chua, whom she regarded as a political enemy. But the opposite happened. Her efforts proved disastrous as Nieto lost.
Manila Rep. Rolando Valeriano, who delivered the privilege speech that triggered the probe on the dubious use of the confidential fund, won overwhelmingly against his opponents in his home district of Tondo. Rep. Sandro Marcos, who was first to sign the Articles of Impeachment, won in Ilocos Norte. The same fate befell then Speaker Martin Romualdez, who signed last, as he won in his home district in Leyte. Meanwhile, Davao del Sur Rep. John Tracy Cagas also won despite the fact that he was the only one of the 12 representatives in the Davao region, who signed the fourth impeachment complaint.
Manila Rep. Bienvenido Abante Jr. lost to candidate Joey Uy, but Abante regained his seat after he filed a disqualification case against him before the watchdog Commission on Elections (Comelec) and won. Then Rep. Majority Leader Manuel Jose Dalipe of Zamboanga City lost to Duterte-endorsed Khymer Olaso in their fight for mayor of that city. Reps. France Castro and Arlene Brosas lost in the senatorial race. Rep. Percival Cendaña of the Akbayan Party List surprised the electorate after his party list group topped the race after garnering 2.7 million votes. Overall, the party list groups that endorsed the impeachment complaint largely won.
NO DUTERTE MAGIC. Barbers said: “They did not vote on candidates, who defended or attacked Duterte. They voted for local leaders who delivered.” The outcome of the Senate race was pivotal. Half of the 24 seats in the Senate were contested. Two candidates – Paolo Benigno Aquino and Francis Pangilinan won along with the likes of Tito Sotto, Ping Lacson, Lito Lapid, and Erwin Tulfo, who were not aligned with the Dutertes. Their political victory balanced the other candidates, who were identified with the Duterte camp. They include the likes of Bong Go, Bato dela Rosa, Rodante Marcoleta, Camille Villar, and Imee Marcos.
Hence, the pro-impeachment majority survived as 100 out of the 115 reelectionist signatories in the House were back. Romualdez retained the House of Representatives leadership. The House allowed the filing of the second impeachment starting on Feb. 2, 2026 and three other subsequent complaints. House secretary-general Cheloy Velicaria Garafil immediately referred those complaints to the House leadership on Feb. 23. The House Committee on Justice by a vote of 55-0 on May 4 , submitted it to the House plenary session.
In short, the House signatories survived in their reelection bids. It showed that their support for the impeachment was not a liability in their district races. It was Alyansa’s senatorial slate that suffered but it was not because of the impeachment issue. It was Tiangco himself who was the problem. He did not do his job adequately as the campaign manager. In brief, he failed and his failure was dismal.
The Senate loss was due to poor campaign management. It only had 21 sorties and there was no local government unit (LGU) machinery for the Senate slate. Moreover, there was failure to handle Imee Marcos and Camille Villar’s sudden defection to Sara’s camp and the sympathy wave in Mindanao after the March 11 arrest of Rodrigo Duterte. There was no leadership in Toby Tiangco’s party. All he did was negligence.
