EXCERPTS of my second book “BUMPS Fifty Years of Dictatorship and Democracy in the Philippines (1972-2022)”:
ANTECEDENTS TO MARTIAL LAW
The intention and direction toward authoritarianism slowly but surely manifested in his second term. The euphoria in his political victory camouflaged intention to stay in Malacanang beyond 1973. Several intervening events took place and his intentions only showed a year or two after his reelection. By that time, the situation had altered significantly and the Philippines fell into the crest of dissent and intellectual ferment. It was no picnic for Marcos. Neither was it for the youth, which became the vanguard of dissent and calls for changes.
His first term that covered the period 1966 to 1969 was described as fairly successful as it had some degree of industrialization, infrastructure build-up, and a marked increase in rice production. Consumed to win a second term, which would cover 1970-1973, Marcos pursued a spending spree unparalleled in its economic dimension and the amount was said to involve $50 million, which he spent freely on infrastructure projects to entice voters to elect him. This unabashed spending triggered a balance of payments crisis, which pushed him to borrow a structural adjustment program, the first for the Philippines, from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Philippines pursued a reduction of selected tariff rates, which led to lower revenue collections, and a devaluation of the peso to almost P6 from the exchange rate of P3.90 for every U.S. dollar. It led to inflation, and eventually, general unrest.
Ferdinand Marcos started his second four-year term, experiencing the onslaughts of the “First Quarter Storm,” or the series of violent student protest demonstrations in the first three months of 1970. It was an inauspicious start because it highlighted his inadequacy to meet dissent. Since then, the urban- based protest movement became his staple, as protests took place inordinately. Students linked up with workers, farmers, teachers, and other professionals to create urban unrest. Students led in the insurrectionary activities even as workers and farmers were organizing a broader front against the Marcos government.
Marcos used the unparalleled rise of the student movement and urban unrest as bases to declare martial law in 1972. Two main developments influenced the political environment of those days: first, the Second Vatican Council, which Pope John XXIII convened in the early 1960s to reform the Roman Catholic Church; and second, the emergence of the Maoist-oriented Communist Party of the Philippines from the remnants of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) in the late 1960s. The teachings of the Second Vatican Council influenced many religious clerics and Filipino youth to constitute the moderate faction of the emerging anti-Marcos forces. The two developments essentially identified the Church as the “Church of the Poor” to atone for its posture toward Adolf Hitler in the Second World War. The phrase “preferential option for the poor” has come to define the modern Church. Many youth leaders took it seriously to form their groups and factions, aptly called “soc-dems,” or social democrats because they adhered to social democracy, an ideology reputedly formulated by Catholic clerics who belonged to the Jesuit order.
On the other side of the political spectrum, Jose Ma. Sison, a young intellectual and teacher, gathered disillusioned intellectuals, leading the official organization of the CPP on Dec. 26, 1968 and the creation on March 29, 1969 of the New People’s Army (NPA) from remnants of the peasant-based Hukbalahap to become its military arm. In 1973, the CPP formed the National Democratic Front (NDF) as the CPP political arm and recruited non-CPP members, or the so-called middle elements, to its fold. The CPP-NPA-NDF have adhered to armed struggle as the means to struggle, although they did not forsake the legal arena. Sison and his followers formulated national democracy to serve as its ideological mooring. This was their way to counter social democracy, which was gathering momentum among the youth in some elite schools like Ateneo College, De La Salle College, University of Sto Tomas, among others.
The State of the Nation Address (SONA) of Marcos before the joint session of Congress on January 26, 1970 turned violent as thousands of student activists clashed with police. It signaled the start of the First Quarter Storm, where student activists in a series of violent demonstrations stormed Malacanang to protest the perceived social inequities. Although the student protest actions subsided when classes ended by end-March, it did not deter students from staging more protests. Mass protest actions by student activists of leftwing groups, on the one side, and moderate groups, on the other side, became common. Marcos was getting alarmed by the evolving anti-Marcos political forces, but he did not take moves, as he weighed his options.
MUSLIM SECESSIONIST WAR. Communist insurgency was not the only existing national security issue, when Marcos declared martial law in 1972. Beneath reports of Muslim-Christian encounters in Mindanao, particularly in the predominantly Muslim areas, the call of certain Muslim leaders for the secession of one-third of the Philippines simmered until it exploded. On October 21, 1972, violence erupted in Marawi City, when between 500 to 1,000 Muslim rebels attacked simultaneously the Mindanao State University campus, the Philippine Constabulary provincial headquarters at Camp Amai Pakpak, and the Pantar bridge on the boundary of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte provinces. The attacks marked the first time the Muslim rebels unfurled the banner of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in their advocacy of secession of the islands of Mindanao, Palawan, Basilan, and Sulu archipelago from the Philippines. They overran the radio station there, urging the Maranao people to support their cause, although it did not gain traction.
The call for secession meant outright independence for a third of the Philippines to form the envisioned Bangsa Moro Republic. This incident led to the emergence of the MNLF leader – an unknown professor of University of the Philippines’s Asian Center and former member of the left-wing Kabataang Makabayan – Nurulladji Dingdanghali Misuari. State troopers quelled the rebellion in Marawi City but not without the escape of Japanese Ambassador to the Philippines Toshio Urabe, who was at MSU campus to attend an official function. The rebels did not know the envoy was in the MSU, but university authorities and military leaders had Urabe donned a disguise to look like a native in his Houdini-like escape from MSU. They whisked him off to return unhurt to Manila.
The secessionist war ignited in other parts of Muslim Mindanao. Violence flared up in western Mindanao and Sulu archipelago. In November 1972, Muslim rebels landed firearms in Jolo and the Tawi-Tawi group in the south. By late December, rebels launched full scale attacks in those islands. By January 1973, the rebels were in control of 80% of Basilan. The AFP contained the situation in the islands, but another front opened in Cotabato. The government forces there were struck by concerted guerilla attacks. By April 1973, it was the turn of Davao to be hit by violence. In February 1974, rebel forces hit Jolo and held it for two days before state troopers regained control after bitter fights. A large part of Jolo was destroyed by fire, bringing untold misery to the civilian Muslim population. Soon, the martial law government of Ferdinand Marcos got alarmed by the intermittent violent incidents, which was said to have started due to land disputes among Christian settlers from Luzon and the Visayas and Muslim population, who were originally based there. Moreover, the 1968 Jabidah massacre contributed to the armed confrontation, which led to a different agenda: Muslim secession.
MINDANAO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT. The Muslim secession movement started in 1968 when Hajji Datu Udtog Matalam, a former governor of Cotabato, formed the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) and launched it on the first day of May 1968. Matalam and his followers were incensed by the Jabidah massacre, a tragedy where Muslim Army recruits were killed by their superiors on March 18, 1968 in their training camp in Corregidor, a rocky island in the Manila Bay. In his privilege speech, Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. alleged the Muslim recruits mutinied when they learned the purpose of their training at Corregidor was to create trouble in the Malaysian province of Sabah. At that time, the Philippines was making a claim of sovereignty over the North Bornean state of Sabah. The Jabidah massacre was said to have awakened the simmering spirit of secession among the Muslim people, the significant minority in Philippine population.
Matalam’s MIM took off the ground because many Muslims saw Mindanao’s secession as a way to get even for what they considered decades, or even centuries of ill-treatment by the Christians, including the Spanish colonial rulers and modern-day politicians. Nur Misuari, one of the young MIM leaders seized the moment by forming the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) as the new vehicle for secession. The MNLF took off the ground, as many Muslims, mostly Maranaos, Tausogs, and Maguindanaons, joined and armed themselves. The MNLF owed its successes to training of its guerillas in Sabah. Soon, Muslim guerillas under Bangsa Moro Army, MNLF’s military arm, were scattered over Mindanao, giving headaches to the martial law government. The separatist movement challenged the AFP.
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION. The secessionist war in Mindanao gained international dimension when it was said to have been receiving funding and access to training facilities from Malaysia through Sabah and firearms from Libya. Because of the Islamic character of the Mindanao separatist movement, the Marcos government sought the mediation of the powerful Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to enable the two sides to go to the negotiating table for a political settlement. Marcos has the reasons to seek an end to the conflict. He feared the OIC member-states to call for a boycott of exporting oil, an important commodity for economic development. The Mindanao conflict constituted a big drain to the national economy. Besides, the Mindanao war somewhat confirmed his nasty reputation as a human rights violator and power-hungry dictator before the international community.
The MNLF did not limit its separatist struggle in the local front. It pursued diplomatic initiatives to get global attention to its secessionist agenda. After getting Indonesia’s support, the Marcos government took steps to woo the OIC. In 1974, they both got OIC’s attention, but the latter only agreed for a political settlement within the confines of the Philippine Constitution and territorial integrity. Also, the MNLF applied for full membership in the OIC, but the latter only gave it an “observer” status. The OIC did not like the MNLF’s demand for a separate state because certain OIC member-states had secessionist issues too. Agreeing to what the MNLF wanted could open the floodgates of their nagging separatist problems, triggering political crises among them. Applying pressure, the OIC succeeded in bringing the Marcos government and the MNLF to the negotiating table for a political settlement.
Under the auspices of the OIC, representatives of the Philippine government and the MNLF met several times in Jeddah and Teheran, leading to the pivotal meeting in Tripoli, Libya on December 15, 1975 . The Philippine delegation to the Tripoli Conference was led by Defense Undersecretary for Civilian Relations Carmelo Barbero. Ferdinand Marcos sensed the importance of the Tripoli talks to send wife Imelda to deal with Libyan strongman Moammar Ghadafi to ensure he would get what he wanted most. In December 24, 1975, the two sides ironed out the Tripoli Agreement that immediately called for a ceasefire on hostilities between their contending armies. It promised autonomy to 13 provinces: Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Palawan, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, South Cotabato and Davao del Sur. The MNLF originally demanded autonomy for the whole of Mindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan area that comprised 21 provinces, but the Philippine panel rejected it and the OIC agreed.
VIRTUAL HOMELAND. The MNLF got several concessions, prompting Nur Misuari to believe that the MNLF under his leadership succeeded in negotiating for a virtual homeland for the Muslim people. But this was far from the truth. While the suggested autonomous region under the Tripoli Agreement would have its own security forces, it was under AFP’s control, not MNLF’s. In brief, the MNLF did not have separate armed forces as they wanted. Moreover, using his authoritarian powers, Marcos did not allow the Tripoli Agreement to take off the ground and become a meaningful accord to govern Muslim-Christian relations. After getting what he wanted most – the ceasefire of all hostilities, he took steps to manipulate the situation to weaken and marginalize the separatist movement. Using his decree-making powers, Marcos called for a plebiscite in the autonomous region, leading to a divided autonomous region without real authority to govern itself. The Tripoli Agreement had little effect on the conflict even as Marcos manipulated the Muslim separatist issue to become a war of attrition.
Marcos used the divide and conquer tactic on the secessionist movement. Sooner than expected, several factions came out of the MNLF. The first to emerge in 1977 was the Moro National Reform Movement composed mostly of former MNLF field commanders and officers. They asked Marcos to include them in talks with the Muslim rebels. Also in 1977 , the Moro Islamic Liberation Front led by Hashim Salamat, an Islamic scholar and former MILF leader who handled international issues. It gained many adherents because Salamat argued for making the practice of Islam a way of life in the Islamic communities. Misuari espoused Islamic socialism to show the heavy influence of Marxist doctrines, when he was a member of the Kabataang Makabayan. In contrast, Salamat advocated Islamic fundamentalism. After MILF, theBangsa Moro National Liberation Organization (BMLO) came out from the Maranao community. The MNLF-Reformist Group also came out to protest Misuari’s alleged return to secession. It was led by Dimasangkay Pundato, a Maranao. Both the MILF and MNLF-Reformist Group were moderate in their orientation as they fought within the framework of autonomy.
Because of the emergence of at least five different groups, all claiming to represent the Muslim communities, Marcos relegated the issue to the backburner. His government refused to meet any group at the negotiating table. Until the 1986 EDSA Revolution took over and deposed Marcos in a near bloodless people’s revolution, the Islamic issue was never discussed. But the government of Corazon Aquino, the successor of Marcos, resurrected it. But this was another story.
